In this paper, I will characterize a new class of inconsistency-adaptive logics, namely inconsistency-adaptive modal logics. These logics cope with inconsistencies in a modal context. More specifically, when faced with inconsistencies, inconsistency-adaptive modal logics avoid explosion, but still allow the derivation of sufficient consequences to adequately explicate the intended part of human reasoning.
Introduction
Paraconsistent modal logics (pML, see e.g. [12, 14, 22] ) are obtained by adding the modal operators (necessity) and ♦ (possibility) to a paraconsistent logic. As usual, dependent on their specific characteristics, the modal operators are interpreted as deontic, alethic, doxastic, epistemic,... operators. Moreover, as pML are based on paraconsistent logics, they do not validate Ex Falso Quodlibet (EFQ: A, ∼A/B). Hence, pML combine the expressive power of modal logics with the non-explosive character of paraconsistent logics. As such, they seem well-suited to explicate normative reasoning, reasoning about beliefs, reasoning about knowledge,... In all of these, people frequently come to inconsistent conclusions, without leaping into triviality (e.g. holding inconsistent beliefs isn't equal to believing everything).
Despite the absence of EFQ, paraconsistent modal logics do not capture the intended part of human reasoning in a realistic way. For, they reach paraconsistency by invalidating some of the classical rules of inference, as for example modus ponens (A, A ⊃ B/B), disjunctive syllogism (A ∨ B, ∼A/B), modus tollens (A ⊃ B, ∼B/∼A), the de Morgan laws,... These inference rules are central to human reasoning. They are frequently used and hardly ever do they lead to trivial consequences. Hence, as pML do not validate these inference rules, they do not have sufficient deductive strength to explicate human reasoning in an adequate way.
The above problem is not specific to pML, but applies to paraconsistent logics in general. Notable exceptions are inconsistency-adaptive logics (iAL, see e.g. [1, 2, 9] ). The latter do not invalidate the above inference rules in general, but only invalidate their problematic applications (the applications that, if allowed, would lead to trivial consequences). Hence, when applied to consistent premise sets, iAL validate all applications, for none of them is problematic in that case. This means that iAL only invalidate those applications of the classical inference rules that are problematic for the specific premise set they are applied to. As a consequence, iAL are said to oscillate between a paraconsistent lower limit logic (allowing no applications of the classical inference rules) and an explosive upper limit logic (allowing all applications of the classical inference rules). In that way, they combine paraconsistency with sufficient deductive power to capture human reasoning in a more realistic way.
Up to now, only iAL with a non-modal lower limit logic have been developed. If modal logics were used by inconsistency-adaptive logicians, this was solely to characterize paraconsistent inference relations (or better, inconsistency handling mechanisms) under a translation, and not to extend the inconsistency-adaptive approach to modal logics as such (see e.g. [4, 6, 8, 11, 17, 18, 19, 23] ). In this paper, I will show that the inconsistencyadaptive framework can be extended to modal logics as well. Basically, I will do so by presenting the inconsistency-adaptive modal logics iATūNs r syn and iATūNs r sem . Both oscillate between the paraconsistent modal logic TūNs and the explosive modal logic T. Moreover, as other inconsistency-adaptive modal logics are characterized equivalently, the result is a new class of iAL: the class of inconsistency-adaptive modal logics.
Overview. In section 2, I will give a short, intuitive characterization of (non-modal) iAL. In section 3, I will present the inconsistency-adaptive modal framework by characterizing the inconsistency-adaptive modal logics iATūNs r syn and iATūNs r sem (sections 3.1-3.3). Moreover, I will also point out a peculiar feature of those inconsistency-adaptive modal logics that are characterized semantically by means of a non-reflexive accessibility relation (section 3.4). Finally, in section 4, I will present a meaningful application of the inconsistency-adaptive modal framework.
Inconsistency-Adaptive Logics
As adaptive logics (AL) include, but are not restricted to inconsistencyadaptive logics (a common misunderstanding about adaptive logics), I will first give a characterization of AL in general. Next, I will turn to inconsistency-adaptive logics in particular. The former will be done by presenting the standard format of AL (see also [3, 5] ), the latter by specifying how inconsistency-adaptive logics fit the standard format of AL (see also [1, 2, 9] ).
The Standard Format. All (standard) adaptive logics are fully characterized by three elements: a lower limit logic (LLL), a set of abnormalities Ω (a set of formulas characterized by a logical form F), and an adaptive strategy.
The LLL is the stable part of an adaptive logic, which comes down to the fact that all LLL-consequences of a premise set are also AL-consequences of that premise set. Proof theoretically, this means that in AL-proofs, all LLL-inference rules may be applied unrestrictedly.
However, an adaptive logic typically enables to derive more consequences from a premise set than its LLL. The supplementary AL-consequences are obtained by interpreting a premise set as normally as possible. This is done by interpreting as false as much elements of Ω (abnormalities) as possible. More specifically, this comes down to the fact that some formulas are conditionally derivable from a premise set: in case Γ LLL A ∨ Dab(∆), with Dab(∆) a Dab-formula (a finite disjunction of abnormalities), then Γ AL A, unless there are reasons to consider some elements of ∆ as true (in which case A cannot safely be considered to be derivable from Γ). Proof theoretically, this means that some conditional inference rules are added to the LLL-proof theory. These may be applied unless or until there are reasons to consider their consequences as problematic.
Which of the conditional AL-consequences of a premise set Γ are also final AL-consequences of Γ, depends on the Dab-consequences of Γ. The latter are the Dab-formulas that are LLL-derivable from Γ. Obviously, not all abnormalities occurring in a Dab-consequence can be considered as false. Otherwise, the Dab-consequence itself cannot possibly be considered as true. Hence, some of the conditional AL-consequences will have to be rejected (because they were derived by mistakenly presupposing some of the abnormalities in a Dab-consequence to be false). Which of them will eventually be rejected, is determined by the adaptive strategy. Moreover, as different strategies might reject different conditional AL-consequences, the adaptive strategy can be regarded as the guideline of how to cope with the Dab-consequences of a premise set.
Notice that in case no Dab-formulas are LLL-derivable from a premise set, it is safe to consider all abnormalities as false. As a consequence, the adaptive logic will then yield the same consequence set as the logic that interprets all abnormalities as false unconditionally (or equivalently, as the logic that fully validates the inference rules whose application the adaptive logic only allows conditionally). This logic is called the upper limit logic (ULL) of an adaptive logic. In general, the ULL is related to the LLL as set out by the Derivability Adjustment Theorem (DAT):
How close the AL-consequence set will come to the ULL-consequence set, depends on the premise set the adaptive logic is applied to. The less Dabconsequences derivable from the premise set, the closer the AL-consequence set will come to the ULL-consequence set. This is why adaptive logicians say that AL adapt themselves to their premise sets.
The Inconsistency-Adaptive Framework. As mentioned in the previous section, inconsistency-adaptive logics (iAL) are based on a paraconsistent LLL. Hence, all consequences obtained from a premise set by this paraconsistent logic are also iAL-consequences of that premise set. More iAL-consequences are obtained by interpreting a premise set as consistent as possible. This means that iAL presuppose inconsistencies to be false unless there are reasons better not to do so, reasons provided by those disjunctions of inconsistencies that are LLL-derivable from the premise set. Obviously, this implies that the set of abnormalities Ω of an inconsistencyadaptive logic is the set of all inconsistencies (possibly limited to those of a restricted form). As a consequence, the ULL of an inconsistency-adaptive logic is a logic that presupposes inconsistencies to be false unconditionally. In other words, the ULL of an inconsistency-adaptive logic is an explosive logic (in most cases, it is even classical logic).
Inconsistency-Adaptive Modal Logics
There are two (more or less related) ways to extend the inconsistencyadaptive framework to modal logics. I have called these respectively the syntactic and the semantic approach to modal inconsistency. To characterize both approaches, I will present the inconsistency-adaptive modal logics iATūNs r syn and iATūNs r sem . The former is obtained by means of the syntactic approach, the latter by means of the semantic approach.
Overview. First, I will characterize the paraconsistent modal logic TūNs that will serve as the LLL of both iATūNs r syn and iATūNs r sem (in section 3.1). Next, I will give an intuitive introduction to both the syntactic as well as the semantic approach to modal inconsistency (in section 3.2). After that, I will present both the semantics and the proof theory of the inconsistencyadaptive modal logics iATūNs r syn and iATūNs r sem , obtained by applying respectively the syntactic and the semantic approach to modal inconsistency (in section 3.3). Finally, I will point out a peculiar feature of the inconsistency-adaptive modal logics whose LLL is characterized by means of a non-reflexive accessibility relation (in section 3.4).
The Paraconsistent Modal Logic TūNs
The paraconsistent modal logic TūNs is a modal extension of the paraconsistent logic CLūNs (see [7] , [16, ch. 4] ). 1 Moreover, as the logic TūNs is semantically characterized by means of a reflexive accessibility relation (see below), it is related to CLūNs in the same way as the (explosive) modal logic T is related to classical logic. Hence, the logic TūNs can be considered as the paraconsistent counterpart of the logic T.
Language Schema. Let L M be the standard propositional modal language with S, S ∼ and W M the sets of sentential letters, negations of sentential letters, and well-formed formulas respectively. Negation, conjunction and necessity are taken as primitive, while the other logical symbols are defined in the usual way.
Semantics. A TūNs-model M for the language L M is a 4-tuple < w 0 , W, R, v >, with W a set of worlds, w 0 the actual world, R a reflexive accessibility relation on W , and v : S ∪ S ∼ × W → {0, 1} an assignment function.
The valuation function v M : W M ×W → {0, 1}, determined by the model M , is defined by means of the following semantic postulates:
A model M verifies a formula A ∈ W M iff v M (A, w 0 ) = 1. Also, a model M is a model of a premise set Γ iff, for all B ∈ Γ, v M (B, w 0 ) = 1. Finally, semantic consequence for the logic TūNs is defined as truth preservation at the actual world w 0 :
Definition 1 Γ TūNs A (A is a TūNs-consequence of Γ) iff A is verified by all TūNs-models of Γ.
Proof Theory. I will present a Fitch-style natural deduction proof theory for the logic TūNs. Before spelling out the proof theoretic rules, two important remarks have to be made. 2 First of all, the proof theory allows for two kinds of subproofs: classical subproofs and modal subproofs. The former are the standard kind of subproofs, well-known from classical logic. The latter are specific for (paraconsistent) modal logics. They show what would follow from the hypothesis if it were true in some arbitrary world (see the structural rules HYP and HYP below).
Secondly, TūNs-proofs do not only make use of well-formed formulas (wffs). They also make use of pseudo-formulas:
The pseudo-formulas S(A, B) and S (A, B) express "the formula B is derivable from the formula A in this world" and "the formula B is derivable from the formula A in any world" respectively. Hence, they are used in the proof theory to represent the conclusions that can be drawn from classical and modal subproofs respectively (see the inference rules CSP and CSP below).
Proof Theoretic Rules. First, consider the structural rules of the TūNs-proof theory. 
REP
In the main proof and in both classical and modal subproofs, formulas (and pseudo-formulas) may be repeated.
REIT Reiteration is restricted to classical subproofs. Hence, formulas (and pseudo-formulas) may be reiterated in unclosed classical subproofs, but not in modal subproofs.
Next, consider the TūNs-inference rules. Those presented by means of a double vertical line (||) allow for derivation in both directions, while the others only allow for left-right derivation.
CSP
If the formula B is the formula on the last line of a classical subproof that started with the hypothesis A, one may conclude to the pseudo-formula S(A, B).
If the formula B is the formula on the last line of a modal subproof that started with the hypothesis A, one may conclude to the pseudo-formula S (A, B).
It is easily verified that the inference rule DIL' below is a derived rule of inference of the logic TūNs.
Proof. Consider the generic TūNs-proof below. It not only proves that DIL' is a derivable inference rule of TūNs, it also illustrates the proof theory of TūNs quite nicely.
2;REIT 9 S(A, C) 8;REP 10 C 7,8,9;DIL 11 C ∨ B 10;ADD 12 S(A, C ∨ B) 6,11;CSP 13 C ∨ B 1,5,12;DIL Derivability. A TūNs-proof is defined as a finite sequence of wffs (and pseudo-wffs), each of which is either a premise or follows from wffs (and pseudo-wffs) earlier in the list by means of a rule of inference. Moreover, in order for such a sequence to be a proof, all its subproofs have to be closed. Finally, TūNs-derivability is defined as follows:
iff there is a proof of the formula A from B 1 , ..., B n ∈ Γ so that A has been derived on a line i of the main proof.
Soundness and Completeness. Soundness and completeness proofs for the logic TūNs can be found in [15] . Hence, they will not be repeated here.
Explosion Reconsidered. In TūNs-models, the assignment function assigns a truth value to both sentential letters and their negations. Some valuation functions make use of this feature to assign truth to both a sentential letter and its negation (by SP2). The result is a paraconsistent negation.
To obtain an explosive negation, SP2 has to be replaced by SP2c below. The latter characterizes the negation classically, whence the resulting logic is explosive.
More specifically, the resulting logic is the normal modal logic T of Feys (von Wright's M). Moreover, the proof theory of the logic T is obtained by adding the following inference rules to the proof theory of the logic TūNs.
The soundness and completeness proofs of the logic T are similar to those of the logic TūNs and can also be found in [15] . To conclude, it is necessary to point out the specific relation between the paraconsistent logic TūNs and the explosive logic T. First, consider the set Inc, the set of all possible inconsistencies (more specifically, all possible inconsistencies that consist of a sentential letter and its negation).
Next, consider theorem 3. It states that the formula A is derivable from a premise set by means of the logic T iff a disjunction of A and some members of Inc is derivable from that premise set by means of the logic TūNs.
Proof. Right-Left. Obvious in view of the inference rules INC and DS. Left-Right. Any T-proof of a formula A can be converted into a TūNs-proof of a formula A ∨ (∆) by making use of the inference rules DIS , DIS ♦ , IMP , IMP ♦ and the derived rule of inference DIL'. Details are left to the reader.
How to Cope with Modal Inconsistency?
In order to specify the inconsistency-adaptive modal framework, the inconsistency-adaptive modal logics iATūNs r syn and iATūNs r sem will be characterized. Both oscillate between the paraconsistent lower limit logic TūNs and the explosive upper limit logic T. Hence, the lower limit logic of both logics is the same. Moreover, both logics are also based on the same adaptive strategy, namely the reliability strategy. 4 As a consequence, the difference between both logics solely has to do with the way the abnormalities are defined. For iATūNs r syn , they are defined by syntactic means (the syntactic approach to modal inconsistency), while for iATūNs r sem , they are defined by semantic means (the semantic approach to modal inconsistency).
Before focussing on each approach separately, it is necessary to stress that, as the resulting logics fall within the inconsistency-adaptive framework, the general aim of both approaches is to interpret a premise set as consistent as possible. This means that the abnormalities defined by the approaches are inconsistencies. More specifically, they are modal inconsistencies. Hence, because both approaches are based on different sets of abnormalities, they not only represent two distinct ways to cope with modal inconsistency, they also represent two distinct ways to define what it is for a modal premise set to be inconsistent.
The Syntactic Approach. Because of the equivalence between theorem 3 (see section 3.1) and the Derivability Adjustment Theorem of adaptive logics (see section 2), it seems quite natural to define the set of abnormalities of inconsistency-adaptive modal logics as identical to the set Inc (see definition 4, section 3.1). This is exactly what is done by the syntactic approach.
Remember that the elements of Ω syn (henceforth, abnormalities syn ) are taken to be modal inconsistencies. Hence, the possibility operators that might occur in them, cannot be interpreted as operators that point to an inconsistency (or to an inconsistent world). They have to be considered an integral part of the inconsistency itself. Obviously, this is quite counterintuitive, for it is a longstanding tradition to identify inconsistencies with formulas of the form B ∧ ∼B. Of course, the counterintuitive result is due to the fact that the set of abnormalities is determined purely on syntactic grounds. Nevertheless, this is not the only reason. It is also due to the fact that (explosive) modal logics yield the trivial consequence set for premise sets from which formulas of the form ♦...♦(B ∧ ∼B) are derivable. This is at least as counterintuitive, for why should triviality be the result of inconsistencies that are merely possible, and not actual? Hence, it might be better to call the elements of Ω syn triviality-generating formulas instead of inconsistencies. If this is done, the syntactic approach to modal inconsistency makes perfect sense: it interprets as much triviality-generating formulas as possible as false. Hence, the syntactic approach to modal inconsistency (I will keep the name!) interprets a premise set as less triviality-generating as possible. 5 The Semantic Approach. Instead of focussing on triviality-generating formulas (as does the syntactic approach), the semantic approach to modal inconsistency focusses on standard inconsistencies, whence on formulas of the form B ∧ ∼B. Hence, the set of abnormalities of inconsistency-adaptive modal logics obtained by means of the semantic approach, is defined as follows:
However, because of the modal (hence, possible world) context, more needs to be said. For, the semantic approach does not focuss on inconsistencies as such. It focusses on reachable inconsistencies, which are inconsistencies (elements of Ω sem ) that are true in a reachable world. A reachable world is a world that is somehow connected with the actual world w 0 . More specifically, a world w n is considered as reachable, whenever it is possible to go from w 0 to w n in a finite number of steps, by jumping from one accessible world to another. Hence, the semantic approach to modal inconsistency interprets a premise set as consistent as possible by interpreting the set of all reachable worlds as consistent as possible. In other words, the approach interprets as much reachable inconsistencies as possible as false.
Obviously, reachable inconsistencies are syntactically represented by the elements of the set Inc (see definition 4, section 3.1). Hence, from a syntactic point of view, the semantic approach will falsify as much elements of the set Inc as possible. So, from this point of view, the semantic approach to modal inconsistency looks exactly the same as the syntactic approach. The only difference seems to be that in the semantic approach, the possibility operators that might occur in the elements of the set Inc, are not considered an integral part of the inconsistency (as in the syntactic approach), but are taken to point to the fact that some inconsistency is true in a reachable world (or, that some reachable world is inconsistent). However, this is not merely a difference in interpretation, because for some premise sets, the approaches do yield different consequence sets (see below).
Comparing the Approaches. To compare both approaches, I will point out the differences and correspondences between the logics iATūNs r syn and iATūNs r sem , obtained by application of respectively the syntactic and the semantic approach to modal inconsistency.
First of all, inconsistency-adaptive modal logics have the same upper limit logic in case they are characterized by the same lower limit logic, even if they are obtained by application of a different approach to modal inconsistency. This is due to the fact that both approaches falsify as much elements of the set Inc as possible. Hence, for both approaches the upper limit logic is the logic that interprets the elements of the set Inc as false unconditionally. Obviously, this logic will only be different in case the lower limit logic is different. As a consequence, the upper limit logic of iATūNs r syn and iATūNs r sem , both based on the lower limit logic TūNs, is the logic T (because of theorem 3).
Secondly, for some premise sets, both approaches yield different consequence sets. As this is best illustrated by means of an example, consider the premise set Γ = {q ∨ ♦(p ∧ ∼p), ♦♦(p ∧ ∼p)}. For the logic iATūNs r syn , the formula q is derivable from Γ in case it is safe to interpret the trivialitygenerating formula ♦(p ∧ ∼p) as false. This is the case, for the formula ♦(p ∧ ∼p) is not derivable from Γ by means of the lower limit logic TūNs. Hence, the formula q is iATūNs r syn -derivable from Γ. On the other hand, for the logic iATūNs r sem , the formula q is derivable from Γ in case it is safe to state that p ∧ ∼p is not a reachable inconsistency. For, if p ∧ ∼p is not a reachable inconsistency, then the formula ♦(p ∧ ∼p) has to be false (as it expresses that p ∧ ∼p is a reachable inconsistency). Because of this, the formula q becomes derivable from Γ. However, the formula ♦♦(p ∧ ∼p) also expresses that p ∧ ∼p is a reachable inconsistency. Hence, as the latter is derivable from Γ by means of the lower limit logic TūNs, it is not safe to state that p ∧ ∼p is not a reachable inconsistency. As a consequence, the formula q is not an iATūNs r sem -consequence of Γ. Finally, despite the differences between both approaches, they are not that different after all. In case the lower limit logic is semantically characterized by an accessibility relation that is both reflexive and transitive, then the inconsistency-adaptive modal logic based on the syntactic approach yields the same consequence set as the logic based on the semantic approach. This will be proven later on (in section 3.3.3).
The inconsistency-adaptive modal logics iATūNs
In this section, I will characterize both the semantics and proof theory of the inconsistency-adaptive modal logics iATūNs r syn and iATūNs r sem . Although both logics are characterized differently, some parts of their characterization are equivalent. For those parts, I will use iATūNs r in order to refer to both iATūNs r sem and iATūNs r syn simultaneously.
Semantics
Intuitively, the logic iATūNs r interprets a premise set as consistent as possible (see section 3.2). Semantically, this is expressed by the fact that the iATūNs r -models of a premise set are those TūNs-models of a premise set that verify the least abnormalities. In other words, the semantics of the logic iATūNs r is a so-called preferential semantics, meaning that some models of a premise set are preferred over others. As a consequence, the iATūNs rconsequences of a premise set are defined by reference to the set of preferred TūNs-models of that premise set. Because the logic iATūNs r is based on the reliable strategy, this set is the set of the reliable TūNs-models of that premise set.
Definition 7 Γ iATūNs r A (A is an iATūNs r -consequence of Γ) iff A is verified by all reliable TūNs-models of Γ.
As the reliable models of a premise set Γ are determined differently for the logics iATūNs r syn and iATūNs r sem , they will be characterized separately.
The Syntactic Approach. Whether a particular TūNs-model M of a premise set Γ is also an iATūNs r syn -model of Γ (henceforth, a reliable syn model of Γ), depends on its abnormal part syn . The latter is the set of abnormalities syn that are verified by the model.
Definition 8
Where M is a TūNs-model, the abnormal part syn of M is the set Ab(M ) syn = {A ∈ Ω syn | v M (A, w 0 ) = 1}.
More specifically, in order for a TūNs-model of a premise set Γ to be a reliable syn model of Γ, its abnormal part syn should not contain any abnormalities syn that are not also in the set U (Γ) syn , the set of unreliable syn formulas of Γ.
The set of unreliable syn formulas of a premise set Γ is the set of all abnormalities syn that occur in a minimal Dab syn -consequence of Γ. A Dab synconsequence of Γ, is a Dab syn -formula (a disjunction of abnormalities syn ) that is TūNs-derivable from Γ. Moreover, a minimal Dab syn -consequence of a premise set Γ is a Dab syn -consequence of Γ for which none of its subformula-disjunctions is also a Dab syn -consequence of Γ.
Definition 10 Dab(∆) is a minimal Dab syn -consequence of Γ iff Γ TūNs Dab(∆) and there is no ∆ ⊂ ∆ such that Γ TūNs Dab(∆ ).
The Semantic Approach. The iATūNs r sem -models of a premise set (henceforth, the reliable sem models of a premise set) are determined more or less in the same way as the reliable syn models. First of all, whether a TūNs-model of a premise set is also a reliable sem model of that premise set, depends heavily on the abnormal part sem of the model, which is the set of all reachable inconsistencies it verifies.
Definition 12
Where M is a TūNs-model, the set of reachable worlds of M is the set Reach(M ) = {w n ∈ W | w n = w 0 , or Rw 0 w n is the case in M , or ∃w i 1 , ..., w i n−1 ∈ W such that Rw 0 w i 1 , Rw i 1 w i 2 , ..., Rw i n−1 w n are the case in M }.
Definition 13
Where M is a TūNs-model, the abnormal part sem of M is the set Ab(
More specifically, a TūNs-model of a premise set Γ is a reliable sem model of Γ in case its abnormal part sem doesn't contain any abnormalities sem (elements of Ω sem ) that are not also in the set U (Γ) sem , the set of unreliable sem formulas of Γ.
The set U sem (Γ) is the set of all abnormalities sem that occur in a minimal Dab sem -consequence of Γ. Notational Convention 2 Dab Θ (∆) = (Θ), for Θ ⊂ Inc and ∆ = {A ∈ Ω sem | A occurs in (Θ)}.
A Dab sem -consequence of Γ is a Dab sem -formula (a disjunction of elements of the set Inc !) that is TūNs-derivable from Γ. Moreover, a minimal Dab sem -consequence Dab Θ (∆) of Γ is a Dab sem -consequence of Γ for which there is no other Dab sem -consequence Dab Θ (∆ ) of Γ such that ∆ ⊂ ∆. Comparing the Approaches bis. The difference between the syntactic and the semantic approach to modal inconsistency can now be stated more clearly. Consider again the premise set Γ = {q ∨ ♦(p ∧ ∼p), ♦♦(p ∧ ∼p)} from section 3.2. Now, consider both the set of unreliable syn formulas and the set of unreliable sem formulas of Γ.
As a consequence, all reliable syn models of Γ falsify the formula ♦(p ∧ ∼p) (as it is not an element of U (Γ) syn ). Hence, the formula q is an iATūNs r synconsequence of Γ (for it is verified by all reliable syn models of Γ). On the other hand, some reliable sem models of Γ do verify the formula ♦(p ∧ ∼p) (for example, see table 1). As some of these models also falsify the formula q, q is not an iATūNs r sem -consequence of Γ.
Proof Theory
As iATūNs r is an adaptive logic, its proof theory has some characteristic features that are shared by all adaptive logics. First of all, an iATūNs rproof is a succession of stages, each consisting of a sequence of lines. Adding a line to a proof means to move on to a next stage of the proof. Secondly, the lines of an iATūNs r -proof consist of four elements (instead of the usual three): a line number, a formula, a justification, and an adaptive condition. The latter is a finite subset of Ω (the set of abnormalities). Thirdly, as long as all elements of the adaptive condition of a line i can be considered as false, the formula of line i is considered as derivable from the premise set. In order to indicate that not all elements of the adaptive condition of line i can be considered as false anymore, line i is marked (formally, this is done by placing the symbol next to the adaptive condition). Obviously, when a line is marked, the formula on that line is not considered as derivable anymore. Finally, the markings of an iATūNs r -proof are dynamic. At some stage of the proof, a line might be marked (resp. unmarked), while at a later stage, it might become unmarked (resp. marked) again.
General Characterization. The iATūNs r -proof theory consists of both deduction rules and a marking criterium. The deduction rules determine how new lines may be added to a proof, while the marking criterium determines at every stage of the proof which lines have to be marked.
As the deduction rules and the marking criterium are different for the logics iATūNs r syn and iATūNs r sem , they will be characterized separately.
The Syntactic Approach. The deduction rules of the logic iATūNs r syn are listed in shorthand notation, with A ∆ expressing that A occurs in the proof on the condition ∆.
Notice that the deduction rules are fully determined by the logic TūNs (the lower limit logic of iATūNs r syn ) and by the set of abnormalities Ω syn . Hence, the deduction rules are completely independent of the adaptive strategy. On the other hand, the marking criterium is completely determined by the adaptive strategy, in casu the reliability strategy.
Whether a line i is marked at a stage s of an iATūNs r syn -proof, depends on the set U s (Γ) syn , the set of unreliable syn formulas at stage s of the proof. The latter are the abnormalities syn that occur in the minimal Dab syn -consequences that have been derived at stage s.
Definition 17 Dab(∆) is a minimal Dab syn -consequence of Γ at stage s of the proof iff Dab(∆) is derived at stage s on the condition ∅ and there is no ∆ ⊂ ∆ such that Dab(∆ ) is also derived at stage s on the condition ∅.
.. the minimal Dab syn -consequences of Γ at stage s of the proof.
Marking now proceeds as follows: at a stage s, a line is marked in case its condition shares some abnormalities with the set U s (Γ) syn . Hence, consider the actual marking definition of the logic iATūNs r syn :
Definition 19 Line i is marked at stage s iff, where ∆ is its condition,
The Semantic Approach. The logic iATūNs r sem also has three deduction rules: PREM, RU, and RC sem . The rules PREM and RU are as for the logic iATūNs r syn (see above). Hence, only the rule RC sem is new. Consider it below.
Not only the deduction rules of the logic iATūNs r sem are quite similar to those of the logic iATūNs r syn , also the marking criterium is. More specifically, marking for iATūNs r sem is defined by reference to the set U s (Γ) sem , the set of unreliable sem formulas at stage s of the proof. The latter are the abnormalities sem that occur in the minimal Dab sem -consequences that have been derived at stage s.
Definition 20 Dab Θ (∆) is a minimal Dab sem -consequence of Γ at stage s of the proof iff Dab Θ (∆) has been derived at stage s on the condition ∅, and there is no Θ ⊂ Inc and no ∆ ⊂ ∆ such that Dab Θ (∆ ) is also derived at stage s on condition ∅.
Marking for the logic iATūNs r sem now proceeds as follows: at stage s, a line is marked in case its condition shares some abnormalities sem with the set U s (Γ) sem . Hence, consider the actual marking definition:
Definition 22 Line i is marked at stage s iff, where ∆ is its condition,
Defining Derivability. At every stage of an iATūNs r -proof from a premise set Γ, all formulas that occur as the second element of an unmarked line are considered as derivable from Γ.
Definition 23 A is derived from Γ at stage s of an iATūNs r -proof iff A is the second element of an unmarked line at stage s.
However, because of the dynamic nature of iATūNs r -proofs, this definition of derivability is rather problematic. Markings may change at every stage of the proof, so that for every new stage, it has to be reconsidered whether or not a formula is derivable from the premise set. Luckily, it is also possible to define a stable notion of derivability, called final derivability.
Definition 24 A is finally derived from Γ on line i of a proof at stage s iff (i) A is the second element of line i, (ii) line i is not marked at stage s, and (iii) every extension of the proof in which line i is marked may be further extended in such a way that line i is unmarked.
Because of its stability, the notion of final derivability is used to define iATūNs r -derivability.
Definition 25 Γ iATūNs r A (A is iATūNs r -derivable from Γ) iff A is finally derived on a line of a proof from Γ.
Example. In order to illustrate the proof theory of both iATūNs r syn and iATūNs r sem , consider the proof below. It is based on the premise set Γ = { (q∨p), ♦ ∼p, (p∨r), ∼r, ♦r, ♦p}. In order to use the same example for both logics, each line of the proof below has two adaptive conditions. The left one is the iATūNs r syn -condition, while the right one is the iATūNs r semcondition. A line is marked for the logic iATūNs r syn (resp. iATūNs r sem ) in case a -symbol is placed next to the corresponding condition.
At stage 8 of the proof, no Dab-consequences have been derived yet. As a consequence, both U 8 (Γ) syn and U 8 (Γ) sem are empty. Accordingly, no lines are marked, so that the formula ♦q (on line 8) is considered as derivable from Γ by both iATūNs r syn and iATūNs r sem .
At stage 9 of the proof, a Dab-consequence has been derived on line 9. As a consequence, U 9 (Γ) syn = {♦(p ∧ ∼p), ♦(r ∧ ∼r)} and U 9 (Γ) sem = {p ∧ ∼p, r ∧ ∼r}, which results in the marking of line 8 for both iATūNs r syn and iATūNs r sem . Hence, at stage 9 of the proof, the formula ♦q is not considered as derivable anymore.
At stage 10 of the proof, the Dab-consequence on line 9 is not a minimal Dab-consequence anymore. For, on line 10 a smaller Dab-consequence has been derived. As a consequence, U 10 (Γ) syn = {♦(r ∧ ∼r)} and U 10 (Γ) sem = {r ∧ ∼r}. Hence, line 8 becomes unmarked again, so that the formula ♦q is again considered as derivable from Γ.
2,6;RU ∅ ∅ Finally, at stage 11 of the proof, another Dab-consequence has been derived. As a consequence, U 11 (Γ) syn = {♦(r ∧ ∼r), ♦♦(p ∧ ∼p)} and U 11 (Γ) sem = {r ∧ ∼r, p ∧ ∼p}. Line 8 becomes marked again, but only for the logic iATūNs r sem . Hence, the formula ♦q is now considered as derivable from Γ by means of the logic iATūNs r syn , but not by means of the logic iATūNs r sem . Moreover, given the premise set Γ, this will also be the case at the final stage of the proof.
Metatheory
First, I will prove soundness and completeness for both iATūNs r syn and iATūNs r sem . Next, I will prove the equivalence of both approaches to modal inconsistency for inconsistency-adaptive modal logics that are based on a lower limit logic that is semantically characterized by means of a reflexive and transitive accessibility relation.
Soundness and Completeness. The logic iATūNs r syn is characterized according to the standard format format of adaptive logics (see section 2). Hence, as soundness and completeness were proven for all adaptive logics that are characterized accordingly (see [5] ), soundness and completeness for the logic iATūNs r syn are given.
Theorem 4 Γ iATūNs r syn
A iff Γ iATūNs r syn A.
The logic iATūNs r sem is not characterized according to the standard format. At least, not completely. Hence, soundness and completeness of iATūNs r sem are proven below. First, consider the following preliminary lemma.
Proof. The proof is completely equivalent to the proof of theorem 6 in [5, p. 233] . Hence, it is left to the reader.
Next, some preliminary remarks are necessary. First, for each set ∆, there is a set ∆ ♦ that is defined as follows:
Second, in the proofs below, I will make use of the classical negation ¬. The latter will be used in a metatheoretical way, to express that a formula is interpreted as false in the classical sense (hence, the formula cannot be both true and false at the same time). As a consequence, it is possible for each set ∆ to define a set ∆ ¬ .
Definition 27 ∆ ¬ = {¬A | A ∈ ∆}. Now, consider two more preliminary lemmas.
Lemma 2 If Γ has TūNs-models, Γ has iATūNs r sem -models as well.
Proof. Suppose the set of TūNs-models of Γ is non-empty. Well now, the reliable sem models of Γ are the TūNs-models M of Γ for which Ab(M ) sem ⊆ U (Γ) sem (see definition 14) . Hence, the reliable sem models of Γ are the TūNs-models M of Γ for which Ab(M ) syn ⊆ (U (Γ) sem ) ♦ (because of definitions 8, 12, 13, and 26). Hence, the reliable sem models of Γ are the TūNs-models of Γ that falsify all elements of the set ((
Differently put, the reliable sem models of Γ are the TūNs-models
As a consequence, Γ has reliable sem models in case 
TūNs A. Moreover, as TūNs is compact (easily verified by relying on definition 3), this implies that there is a finite Γ ⊆ Γ and a finite Θ ⊂ (Ω sem ) ♦ such that Γ ∪ Θ ¬ TūNs A. But, then also Γ TūNs A ∨ (Θ) (by the characterization of classical negation). Hence, as the logic TūNs is monotonic, Γ TūNs A ∨ (Θ), which actually comes down to the following: Γ TūNs A ∨ Dab Θ (∆) for a finite ∆ ⊂ Ω sem . Right-Left. Suppose there is a finite ∆ ⊂ Ω sem , Γ TūNs A ∨ Dab Θ (∆) and ∆ ∩ U (Γ) sem = ∅. First of all, Γ iATūNs r sem A holds vacuously if the set of TūNs-models is empty. So, suppose it is not empty and that all its members verify A ∨ Dab Θ (∆). Hence, the set of reliable sem models of Γ is also not empty (by lemma 2). As ∆ ∩ U (Γ) sem = ∅, all reliable sem models falsify Dab Θ (∆) (otherwise, Ab(M ) sem U (Γ) sem ). So, all reliable sem models verify A. Hence, Γ iATūNs r A (by definition 7).
Finally, both soundness and completeness for the logic iATūNs r sem can now be proven.
Proof. Immediate from lemma 1, lemma 3, and the soundness and completeness of the logic TūNs (theorem 2).
Comparing the Approaches tris. In section 3.2, I claimed that the syntactic and semantic approach to modal inconsistency yield the same consequence set in case the lower limit logic of the inconsistency-adaptive modal logic is both reflexive and transitive. I will now prove this. First, consider the following two facts which follow immediately from the reflexivity and transitivity of the accessibility relation. 
Lemma 5 For
Proof. Left-Right. Suppose A ∈ U (Γ) syn . Hence, there is a finite Θ ⊂ Ω syn such that Dab({A}∪Θ) is a minimal Dab syn -consequence of Γ (by definition 11). Hence, for ∆ = {B ∈ Ω sem | B occurs in ({A} ∪ Θ)}, Dab {A}∪Θ (∆) is a minimal Dab sem -consequence of Γ (by lemma 4). As a consequence, ∆ ⊂ U (Γ) sem (by definition 15), which also means that A ∈ (U (Γ) sem ) ♦ . Right-Left. Suppose A ∈ (U (Γ) sem ) ♦ . Hence, B ∈ U (Γ) sem , for B ∈ Ω sem and B occurs in A (by definition 26). This means that there is a Θ ⊂ Ω syn and a ∆ ⊂ Ω sem such that Dab {A}∪Θ ({B} ∪ ∆) is a minimal Dab semconsequence of Γ (by definition 15, and by the reflexivity and transitivity of the accessibility relation). Hence, Dab({A} ∪ Θ) is a minimal Dab synconsequence of Γ (by lemma 4), which means that A ∈ U (Γ) syn (by definition 11).
Finally, consider the following theorem. It states that, if the lower limit logic of an inconsistency-adaptive modal logic is both reflexive and transitive, the reliable models of a premise set will be the same for both approaches to modal inconsistency. Hence, from this theorem, it immediately follows that the consequence set of a premise set will be the same for both approaches. 
A Peculiar Feature: Semi-Explosion
Despite the many nice features of the inconsistency-adaptive modal framework presented in this paper, some of the inconsistency-adaptive modal logics (iaML) that fall within the framework, do not avoid explosion completely. I am referring to the iAML of which the lower limit logic (LLL) is characterized by means of a non-reflexive accessibility relation. Henceforth, I will call these logics non-reflexive iAML.
Example. Consider the iAML-proof below, based on the premise set Γ = { (q ∧ ∼q)}. This proof shows that it is possible to derive from Γ the formula ⊥ (with ⊥ meaning triviality) on the condition {♦(q ∧ ∼q)}.
1
(q ∧ ∼q) PREM ∅ ∅ 2 ⊥ 1;RC syn /RC sem {♦(q ∧ ∼q)} {q ∧ ∼q}
As ⊥ is a trivial consequence, line 2 should get marked at some stage of the proof. And indeed, in case the accessibility relation of the LLL is reflexive, the proof can always be extended in such a way that line 2 gets marked.
2 ⊥ 1;RC syn /RC sem {♦(q ∧ ∼q)} {q ∧ ∼q} 3 ♦(q ∧ ∼q) 1;RU ∅ ∅ However, in case the accessibility relation of the LLL isn't reflexive, the proof cannot be extended in the way shown above (as ♦(q ∧ ∼q) is not derivable from (q ∧ ∼q)). Hence, line 2 will remain unmarked, so that the formula on line 2 is considered as finally derivable from the premise set Γ.
The example clearly shows that in case non-reflexive iAML are applied to premise sets such as Γ, they allow the derivation of all consequences of the form A. Nevertheless, they do not yield the trivial consequence set. Hence, I have called this feature semi-explosion. In order to grasp what actually happens in the example (and in equivalent cases), consider things semantically. First, remember that the iAMLmodels of a premise set are those LLL-models of a premise set that verify the least abnormalities. Hence, when the LLL-models verify some necessary inconsistencies (in the example: (q∧∼q)), the LLL-models that verify the least abnormalities, are the LLL-models for which the set of accessible worlds is empty. 6 Because of the semantic characterization of necessity, this results in semi-explosion. Moreover, the reason why semi-explosion doesn't occur for reflexive iAML, is also obvious: the set of accessible worlds for reflexive LLL-models is always a non-empty set.
For obvious reasons, the iAML that validate semi-explosion, suffer from the same problems as explosive modal logics (see section 1). Luckily, it is possible to make some changes to the iAML-framework in order to avoid semi-explosion. But, as this requires some extra work, its characterization is postponed to a follow-up paper.
Application: Paraconsistent Intuitionistic Logic
To concretize the inconsistency-adaptive modal framework characterized in the previous sections, I will now present a useful application. Specifically, I will show how the framework can be applied to characterize a meaningful paraconsistent version of intuitionistic logic (Int). Next, consider theorem 7 below. It spells out how to interpret the logic Int in the logic S4.
Paraconsistent Intuitionistic Logic. In order to characterize a meaningful paraconsistent version of intuitionistic logic (let's call it pInt), the logic S4 in theorem 7 can be replaced by the inconsistency-adaptive modal logic iAS4ūNs r syn that is characterized by the lower limit logic S4ūNs, 7 the set of abnormalities Ω syn and the reliability strategy. The main advantage of the logic pInt consists in the fact that for consistent premise sets, it yields the same consequences as the logic Int, while for inconsistent premise sets, it only yields those consequences that can be derived by interpreting the premise set as consistent as possible. As this is most clearly illustrated by means of the example, let's have a look at the one below.
Example. Consider the premise set Γ = {p ⊃ q, p ⊃ ∼q, p, r ⊃ s, r}, which is mapped to the premise set Γ * = { ( p ⊃ q), ( p ⊃ (∼( q))), p, ( r ⊃ s), r}. The iAS4ūNs r syn -proof now proceeds as follows.
